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The Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was an Anglo-American offensive of strategic bombing during World War II in Europe. The primary portion of the CBO was against Luftwaffe targets which was the highest priority from June 1943 to 1 April 1944.〔Craven and Cate Vol III p. 56〕 The subsequent highest priority campaigns were against V-weapon installations (June 1944) and petroleum, oil, and lubrication (POL) plants (September 1944). Additional CBO targets included railyards and other transportation targets, particularly prior to the invasion of Normandy and, along with army equipment,〔 〕 in the final stages of the War in Europe. The British bombing campaign was chiefly waged by night by large numbers of heavy bombers until the latter stages of the war when German fighter defences were so reduced that daylight bombing was possible without risking large losses. The US effort was by day – massed formations of bombers with escorting fighters. Together they made up a round-the-clock bombing effort except where weather conditions prevented operations. The Pointblank directive initiated Operation Pointblank that was the code name for the primary portion〔Emerson p. 4〕 of the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive intended to cripple or destroy the German aircraft fighter strength, thus drawing it away from frontline operations and ensuring it would not be an obstacle to the invasion of Northwest Europe. The Pointblank directive of 14 June 1943 ordered RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force to bomb specific targets such as aircraft factories, and the order was confirmed at the Quebec Conference, 1943. Up to that point the Royal Air Force and United States Army Air Forces had mostly been attacking German industry in their own way – the British by broad night attacks on industrial areas and the US in "precision attacks" on specific targets. The operational execution of the Directive was left to the commanders of the forces and as such even after the directive the British continued in night attacks and the majority of the attacks on German fighter production.〔(【引用サイトリンク】 Aspects of The British and American Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939 to 1945 )〕〔Zaloga p12〕 ==Casablanca directive== Both the British and the US (through the Air War Plans Division) had drawn up their plans for attacking the Axis powers. After the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) published the "Bombers' Baedeker" in 1942 that identified the "bottleneck" German industries of oil, communications, and ball bearings,〔 (cited by Coffey, p. 237)〕 the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the January 1943 Casablanca Conference to conduct the "Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom" and the British Air Ministry issued the Casablanca directive on 4 February with the object of: "The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. Every opportunity to be taken to attack Germany by day to destroy objectives that are unsuitable for night attack, to sustain continuous pressure on German morale, to impose heavy losses on German day fighter force and to conserve German fighter force away from the Russian and Mediterranean theatres of war." After initiating the preparation of a U.S. targeting plan on December 9, 1942; on March 24, 1943, General "Hap" Arnold, the USAAF Commander requested target information from the British,〔: : (quoted by AAFRH-3, p. vii) : (cited by AAFRH-10, p. 212) : (quoted by Mets note 51, pp. 191,383) : (the letter "''included a report by Arnold's operations analysts about strategic targets in Europe''" (Coffey, p. 203-4) and was delivered by Col. C. P. Cabell, "It was ... a week before he took the letter to Portal, along with one signed by General Eaker" (Coffey, p. 205): ::cover letter: (quoted by Coffey, p. 206) : (quoted by Coffey, p. 237) : (identified in AAFRH-10, p. 82) : (identified in AAFRH-10, p. 86) 〕 and the "Report of Committee of Operations Analysts" was submitted to Arnold on March 8, 1943〔AAFRH-10 page 13〕 and then to the Eighth Air Force commander as well as the British Air Ministry, the MEW, and the RAF commander. The COA report recommended 18 operations during each three-month phase (12 in each phase were expected to be successful) against a total of 76 specific targets.〔 *AAFRH-3: *AAFRH-18: *AAFRH-19: *AAFRH-22: (p. 6))〕 Using the COA report and information from the MEW, in April 1943 an Anglo-American committee (composed of British Chiefs of Staff and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff) under Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker; led by Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.; and including Brig. Gen. Orvil A. Anderson completed a plan for the "Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom", which projected the US bomber strength for the four phases (944, 1,192, 1,746, & 2,702 bombers) through to 31 March 1944.〔Stormont p 15〕 Eaker added a summary and final changes such as: "''If the growth of the German fighter strength is not arrested quickly, it may become literally impossible to carry out the destruction planned''"〔 ("Intermediate Objectives" section).〔Jablonski Vol II p 155〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Combined Bomber Offensive」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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